

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 RANGOO 02616 01 OF 06 220400Z
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 EA-10 ISO-00 AID-05 ACDA-12 HA-05 CIAE-00
H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02
SS-15 ICA-11 EB-08 TRSE-00 COME-00 SNM-05 OMB-01
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P R 220200Z JUL 78
FM AMEMBASSY RANGOON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5670
INFO CINCPAC
SECDEF WASH DC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 6 RANGOON 2616

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, MPOL, BM
SUBJECT: INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE--BURMA--
FY 1980

REF: (A) STATE 167901; (B) STATE 182987

1. SUMMARY: BURMA, FOR THE THREE DECADES OF ITS INDEPENDENCE AN
ADAMANTLY NEUTRALIST AND SOCIALIST ANOMALY ON WESTERN EDGE OF THE
INDOCHINESE PENINSULA, CONTINUES TO COPE--IN BALANCE, WITH
CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS--WITH HARDY INSURGENCIES AND A LARGE
ILLICIT NARCOTICS TRADE. ITS ECONOMY, HOWEVER, STILL FOUNDERS--
NEARLY PARALYZED BY THE GOVERNMENT SYSTEM, MISMANAGEMENT, AND A
LOSS OF RESOURCES TO THE INSURGENCIES--AND IT PROBABLY WILL
CONTINUE TO DO SO IN THE NEAR FUTURE. DESPITE THESE FORMIDABLE
PROBLEMS, THE BURMESE HAVE ESCHEWED FOREIGN ENTANGLEMENTS AND
HAVE PRESERVED THEIR INDEPENDENCE--NO MEAN ACCOMPLISHMENT.
THE UNITED STATES HAS AN INTEREST IN PRESERVING THE STABILITY AND
INDEPENDENCE OF BURMA AND IN THE MAINTENANCE OF CORDIAL BILATERAL
RELATIONS. WE HAVE AN IMPORTANT INTEREST IN THE CONTINUED
COOPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF BURMA IN ATTEMPTING TO SUPPRESS
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PAGE 02 RANGOO 02616 01 OF 06 220400Z

THE ILLICIT OPIUM TRADE FLOWING OUT OF THE NORTHEAST OF THE
COUNTRY, PART OF THE NOTORIOUS GOLDEN TRIANGLE. BURMA'S
ANNUAL FOREIGN MILITARY PROCUREMENT, WHICH IS SOLELY ON A
CASH-AND-CARRY BASIS, IS MODEST AND FROM THE U.S PROBABLY WILL
AMOUNT TO NO MORE THAN ONE MILLION DOLLARS ANNUALLY IN CASH FMS
AND COMMERCIAL PURCHASES--LARGELY FOR SPARE PARTS. WE HAVE
PROPOSED A SMALL IMET PROGRAM. DESPITE A CHECKERED HUMAN

RIGHTS RECORD, NOT UNIQUE IN STATES OF BURMA'S CIRCUMSTANCES,
WE URGE THAT THIS IMET AND THE CONTINUATION OF THE MODEST
LEVEL OF SALES SERVES NET U.S. INTERESTS. END SUMMARY

2. STATEMENTS OF U.S. INTERESTS AND U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE
OBJECTIVES IN BURMA

A. INTERESTS

(1) STRATEGIC/SECURITY: REGIONAL STABILITY

THE U.S. HAS A MAJOR INTEREST IN PRESERVING A STABLE, SECURE
AND INDEPENDENT SOUTHEAST ASIA, OF WHICH BURMA FORMS THE
WESTERN FLANK. THE BURMA COMMUNIST PARTY (BCP) AND, TO A LESSER
EXTENT, OTHER INSURGENT ORGANIZATIONS REPRESENT POTENTIAL
LONG-TERM THREATS TO BURMESE STABILITY AND SECURITY, HENCE TO
THIS INTEREST.

(2) ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL

U.S. ECONOMIC PROSPERITY. THE EXPANSION OF U.S. EXPORTS
TO BURMA AND DEVELOPING AN ATMOSPHERE THAT WOULD BE CONDUCIVE
TO FUTURE U.S. INVESTMENTS IN BURMA, ESPECIALLY IN THE EXTRAC-
TION OF MINERALS AND HYDROCARBONS.

(3) POLITICAL.
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PAGE 03 RANGOO 02616 01 OF 06 220400Z

TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, GIVEN ITS NEUTRALIST ORIENTATION,
THAT BURMA ACT IN WAYS CONSONANT WITH U.S. MULTILATERAL INTERESTS.

(4) NARCOTICS.

REDUCTION OR ELIMINATION OF ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS
FROM BURMA TO THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE.

(5) HUMANITARIAN.

IMPROVING THE QUALIFY OF LIFE FOR THE POORER SEGMENT OF THE
POPULATION, THOSE SUFFERING FROM NATURAL DISASTERS, ETC.

(6) HUMAN RIGHTS.

PROMOTING RESPECT FOR FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS.

B. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES:

IN RECENT YEARS, U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO BURMA HAS
CONSISTED EXCLUSIVELY OF FMS FOR CASH AND COMMERCIAL SALES,

MOSTLY SPARE PARTS AND AMMUNITION FOR EQUIPMENT FURNISHED UNDER MAP PRIOR TO 1970. THESE SALES USUALLY AMOUNT TO \$1 MILLION A YEAR IN VALUE. THE OBJECTIVES ARE:

(1) TO HELP BURMA'S ARMED FORCES TO DEFEND AGAINST MULTIPLE INSURGENT THREATS BY SUPPORTING REQUESTS FOR FMS FOR CASH AND COMMERCIAL SALES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND AMMUNITION, AND BY OFFERING A MODEST IMET PROGRAM.

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PAGE 01 RANGOO 02616 02 OF 06 220407Z
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 EA-10 ISO-00 AID-05 ACDA-12 HA-05 CIAE-00
H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02
SS-15 ICA-11 EB-08 TRSE-00 COME-00 SNM-05 OMB-01
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5671
INFO CINCPAC
SECDEF WASHDC
JCS WASH DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 6 RANGOON 2616

(2) TO PROMOTE BILATERAL COOPERATION ACROSS THE BOARD, ESPECIALLY IN CONNECTION WITH NARCOTICS SUPPRESSION, WHICH IN BURMA IS MAINLY CARRIED OUT BY THE ARMED FORCES. OUR REFUSAL TO SELL BURMA THE NECESSARY SPARE PARTS AND AMMUNITION FOR US-PROVIDED EQUIPMENT WOULD HAVE A SEVERE DELETERIOUS EFFECT ON BILATERAL COOPERATION.

3. PERCEIVED THREAT AND STRATEGY.

THE BURMESE PERCEIVE THAT THE ONLY EXTRENAL MILITARY THREAT IS THAT TRADITIONALLY POSED BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC), BUT GIVE LITTLE CREDENCE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A DIRECT PRC MILITARY ATTACK. THE GUB DOES NOT SEEM TO CONSIDER ITS OTHER NEIGHBORS AS CONSTITUTING REAL MILITARY THREATS.

THE GUB CONSIDERS THE MILITARY THREAT POSED BY PRC-BACKED COMMUNIST INSURGENCY AND THE INSURGENCIES OF ETHNIC MINORITIES SEEKING AUTONOMY OR SEPARATE NATIONAL STATUS TO BE MORE

SERIOUS THREATS TO NATIONAL STABILITY.

WHILE THE GUB HAS PROBABLY DEVELOPED CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR
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PAGE 02 RANGOO 02616 02 OF 06 220407Z

THE DEFENSE OF ALL OF ITS INTERNATIONAL BORDERS, THEY
RECOGNIZE THEIR INABILITY TO MEET A MAJOR EXTERNAL ATTACK AND
THUS HAVE NOT TAKEN SIGNIFICANT STEPS TO ORGANIZE OR EQUIP
MILITARY FORCES SPECIFICALLY TO MEET SUCH ATTACKS. WITH REGARD
TO THE INSURGENCIES IN GENERAL, THE STRATEGY IS ESSENTIALLY
DEFENSIVE, ONE OF CONTAINMENT OF INSURGENT FORCES AND AREAS
OF INFLUENCE. NO DOUBT THE BURMESE WOULD PREFER A MORE
AGGRESSIVE POSTURE, BUT IN VIEW OF THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF
THE INSURGENT FORCES, DIFFICULT TERRAIN, LIMITED BURMESE
RESOURCES, ETC., THIS IS NOT VIEWED AS A PRACTICAL OPTION AT
THE MOMENT.

4. MISSION PERCEPTION OF THREAT.

WHILE THE MISSION IN GENERAL HAS NO ARGUMENT WITH THE
BURMESE PERCEPTION OF THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREAT, WE
BELIEVE THE BURMESE LACK SUFFICIENT CONCERN FOR THE CAPABILITY
OF THEIR MAJOR INTERNAL OPPONENTS, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE
TREND TOWARD A MORE AGGRESSIVE BCP STRATEGY OVER THE PAST 18
MONTHS AND THE APPARENT CONTINUATION OF PRC AID--BOTH MATERIAL
AND TRAINING.

A CHRONIC BURMESE TENDENCY TO UNDERESTIMATE THE INSURGENT
POTENTIAL AND TO OVERESTIMATE THEIR OWN CAPABILITIES--DOUBTLESS
STEMMING FROM SUCCESSES AGAINST THE BCP IN THE PAST THREE DECADES--
IS A WEAKNESS. THE CONTINUING DRAIN OF RESOURCES TO COPE WITH
THE INSURGENCIES AND THE CHRONIC INSECURITY OF SEVERAL
MINING AREAS RESTRICTS BURMA'S ECONOMIC POTENTIAL. WHILE THE
SUCCESSION TO AGAING STRONGMAN NE WIN PROBABLY WILL NOT BE
AFFECTED DIRECTLY BY THE INSURGENCIES, THE BLEEDING ULCERS
ON THE FRONTIER PROBABLY WILL PROVIDE A RATIONALE FOR THE
CONTINUATION OF MILITARY-BASED RULE.

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 RANGOO 02616 02 OF 06 220407Z

5. BURMESE PERCEPTION OF THE TYPE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT NEEDED TO MEET THE THREAT.

TO DEAL WITH THE PRINCIPAL INSURGENCIES IN THE BORDER
REGIONS THE BURMESE CONSIDER A LARGE ARMY ESTABLISHMENT
COMPOSED PRINCIPALLY OF LIGHT INFANTRY COMBAT UNITS SUPPORTED

BY A SMALL PROFESSIONAL AIR FORCE AND NAVY BEST SUITED FOR RESPONDING TO THE NEEDS OF THE COUNTRY. THIS IS, ESSENTIALLY, THE CURRENT ORGANIZATION.

IF IT WERE FEASIBLE TO MODIFY THE PRESENT-DAY MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, IT IS LIKELY THREE ADDITIONAL INFANTRY DIVISIONS WOULD BE ORGANIZED TO PROVIDE INCREASED MOBILITY. ADDITIONALLY, EMPHASIS WOULD BE PLACED ON INCREASING AIR FORCE TACTICAL AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT (OF THE ARMY) AND NAVY COASTAL PATROL CAPABILITIES, AND UPON MODERNIZATION/STANDARDIZATION OF ARMY WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT (FOR LIGHT INFANTRY OPERATIONS).

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 01 RANGOO 02616 03 OF 06 220426Z
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 EA-10 ISO-00 AID-05 ACDA-12 HA-05 CIAE-00
H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02
SS-15 ICA-11 EB-08 TRSE-00 COME-00 SNM-05 OMB-01
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FM AMEMBASSY RANGOON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5672
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SECDEF WASH DC
JCS WASH DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 6 RANGOON 2616

6. ASSESSMENT OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT.

THE CURRENT BURMESE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT HAS DEMONSTRATED A CAPABILITY TO MARSHAL AND DIRECT ITS RESOURCES TO MEET THE CURRENT LEVEL OF INSURGENT OFFENSIVES, ALTHOUGH AT SIGNIFICANT RELATIVE COST. THE MILITARY IS THE SINGLE STRONGEST ELEMENT IN THE NATION AND PROVIDES A STABILIZING INFLUENCE WITHIN THE COUNTRY. MILITARILY, IT IS CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING RELATIVELY EFFECTIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST INSURGENTS AND NARCOTICS TRAFFICKETS (IN THE LATTER INSTANCE USING EQUIPMENT PROVIDED BY THE U.S. NARCOTICS CONTROL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM).

IT SHOULD BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT BURMA'S MILITARY CAPABILITIES CONTINUE TO DETERIORATE AS MILITARY EQUIPMENT GROWS OLDER AND MORE DIFFICULT AND COSTLY TO MAINTAIN. ALL

SERVICES ARE BADLY IN NEED OF MODERNIZATION AND STANDARDIZATION OF EQUIPMENT.

7. DEFENSE SPENDING.

WE ESTIMATE THAT BURMA'S DEFENSE BUDGET IS APPROXIMATELY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 RANGOO 02616 03 OF 06 220426Z

27 TO 30 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET, EXCLUDING QUASI-COMMERCIAL GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS, AND APPROXIMATELY 3 PERCENT OF THE GNP. (IN 1976-77, THE WORLD BANK ESTIMATED THAT 32.4 PERCENT OF GUB EXPENDITURES WERE DEVOTED TO SUSTAINING BURMA'S ARMED FORCES.) THE EMBASSY HAS NO ACCURATE INFORMATION ON THE TOTAL VALUE OF MILITARY IMPORTS, BUT BELIEVES THE DOLLAR VALUE TO BE RELATIVELY SMALL. BURMA RUNS A CHRONIC CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT, WHICH IS LARGELY OFFSET BY LARGE INFLOWS OF LONG TERM CAPITAL. TO ATE, DEBT SERVICING HAS NOT POSED ANY SPECIAL DIFFICULTY AS BURMA HAS ALWAYS BEEN ABLE TO MEET ITS EXTERNAL OBLIGATIONS. NEVERTHELESS, UNLESS BURMA CAN GREATLY INCREASE ITS EXPORT EARNING OVER THE NEXT FIVE TO TEN YEARS, SERIOUS DEBT SERVICING PROBLEMS ARE INEVITABLE. IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT THE COST OF THE INSURGENCY COULD ASSUME GREATER IMPORTANCE.

8. ECONOMIC IMPACT.

BURMA SUFFERS FROM A CHRONIC SCARCITY OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE, LARGELY BECAUSE OF LIMITED EXPORTS. THE SHORTAGE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE UNQUESTIONABLY HAS HAMPERED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. EXPENDITURES ON U.S. MILITARY EQUIPMENT, HOWEVER, HAVE BEEN AVERAGING LESS THAN \$1 MILLION A YEAR--ABOUT 1/2 OF ONE PERCENT OF TOTAL IMPORTS--AND SHOULD HOLD AT ABOUT THAT LEVEL FOR THE NEXT TWO YEARS. THERE ARE AMPLE CREDITS AVAILABLE TO BURMA FROM INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS FOR DEVELOPMENT PURPOSES. THE AMOUNT OF CREDIT EXTENDED IS LIMITED MAINLY BY BURMA'S CAPACITY TO UTILIZE SUCH CREDIT EFFECTIVELY. SINCE BURMA'S SOCIALIST PHILOSOPHY PROHIBITS PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENTS, A MAJOR SOURCE OF CAPITAL INFLOW IS NOT AVAILABLE. PROJECTED EXPENDITURES UNDER THE U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM ARE MINISCULE AND WOULD HAVE NO APPRECIABLE IMPACT ON BURMA'S DEVELOPMENT.
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 RANGOO 02616 03 OF 06 220426Z

9. ARMS CONTROL IMPACT.

THERE IS NO POSSIBLE ARMS CONTROL IMPACT OR ANY OTHER
EXTRENAL RAMIFICATION WHICH WOULD ARISE FROM THE TRANSFER OF
DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES TO BURMA UNDER CURRENT OF
PROJECTED U.S. PROGRAMS.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 RANGOO 02616 04 OF 06 220438Z
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 EA-10 ISO-00 AID-05 ACDA-12 HA-05 CIAE-00
H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02
SS-15 ICA-11 EB-08 TRSE-00 COME-00 SNM-05 OMB-01
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FM AMEMBASSY RANGOON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5673
INFO CINCPAC
SECDEF WASH DC
JCS WASH DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 6 RANGOON 2616

10. HUMAN RIGHTS.

THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN BURMA IS NOT APPRECIABLY
DIFFERENT IN QUALITY FROM THAT IN MOST DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
WITH SIMILAR PROBLEMS AND TRADITIONS. AS IN EASTERN EUROPEAN STATES,
WHICH HAVE SERVED AS MODELS FOR ASPECTS OF BURMA'S SYSTEM
FREEDOMS OF EXPRESSION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION ARE LIMITED
OR DENIED. NO PUBLIC CRITICISM OF GOVERNMENT LEADERS OR POLICIES
IS TOLERATED AND ALL MEDIA ARE UNDER STRICT GOVERNMENT CONTROL.
THERE ARE NO LEGAL OPPOSITION POLITICAL PARTIES. FREEDOM OF
MOVEMENT BOTH WITHIN BURMA AND ABROAD IS RESTRICTED, TO SOME
EXTENT FOR VALID SECURITY REASONS. POLITICALLY INSPIRED
ARRESTS ARE COMMONPLACE, AND ON ANUMBER OF PAST OCCASIONS HAVE
BEEN WIDESPREAD. SOME DETAINEES ARE LATER TRIED ON CRIMINAL
CHARGES; OTHERS ARE HELD OR RELEASED WITHOUT TRIAL. THE EMBASSY
LACK AUTHORITATIVE INFORMATION ON POLITICAL PRISONERS,
BUT WE ARE AWARE OF INDIVIDUAL CASES OF HARSH TREATMENT. IN
KEEPING WITH ITS SOCIALIST PHILOSOPHY, THE GUB IS DEDICATED
TO THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR ALL. ITS POLICIES SINCE
THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT TOOK POWER IN 1962 HAVE BROUGHT ABOUT A
SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC LEVELLING, BUT HAVE NOT SUCCEEDED IN
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 RANGOO 02616 04 OF 06 220438Z

RAISING THE GENERAL STANDARD OF LIVING, WHICH IS ONE OF THE LOWEST IN THE WORLD. ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGE OF MULTIPLE ARMED INSURGENCIES HAS KEPT THE COUNTRY MORE OR LESS ON A WARTIME FOOTING FOR THE PAST 30 YEARS, A FACTOR WHICH SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION WHEN EVALUATING BURMA'S HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE. ALSO, BURMA HAS A LONG HISTORY OF EXTREME AUTOCRATIC GOVERNMENT, WHICH DOES NOT PROVIDE A FERTILE ENVIRONMENT FOR THE GROWTH OF WESTERN CONCEPTS OF FREEDOM AND JUSTICE.

IN OUR JUDGEMENT, THE U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM HAS LITTLE OR NO BEARING ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION. OUR MODEST PROGRAM PROVIDES NO LEVERAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS OR ANY OTHER ISSUE. TO DENY OR THREATEN TO DENY MILITARY SALES ON HUMAN RIGHTS GROUNDS WOULD ABRUPTLY TERMINATE WHATEVER GOOD WILL AND FUTURE PROSPECTS WE MIGHT HAVE HERE.

11. SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER SOURCES.

A. ECONOMIC.

AT PRESENT THERE IS NO PROGRAM OF U.S. BILATERAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO BURMA.

FOREIGN LOAN COMMITMENTS TO BURMA HAVE AVERAGED \$90 MILLION ANNUALLY BETWEEN 1972 AND 1976. JAPAN HAS BEEN THE PRINCIPAL SOURCE OF BILATERAL ASSISTANCE, FOLLOWED BY WEST GERMANY AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. ADDITIONALLY, FOREIGN GRANTS HAVE AVERAGED ABOUT \$25 MILLION ANNUALLY, PRIMARILY FROM JAPAN, THE UN, THE COLOMBO PLAN AND WEST GERMANY. THE UNDP'S PLANNING FIGURE FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECTS IN BURMA FOR 1977-81 IS \$40 MILLION, PLACING BURMA AMONG THE TOP TEN RECIPIENTS OF UNDP ASSISTANCE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 RANGOO 02616 04 OF 06 220438Z

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 RANGOO 02616 05 OF 06 220453Z
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 EA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10 L-03
NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11 AID-05
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5674
INFO CINCPAC
SECDEF WASH DC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 5 OF 6 RANGOON 2616

B. MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIES CORPORATION OF BURMA, WHICH HAS A CHARTER TO SUPPLY BURMA'S DEFENSE MATERIAL NEEDS, CURRENTLY LACKS THE PRODUCTION CAPABILITY AND TECHNICAL KNOW-HOW TO SATISFY MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND AMMUNITION NEEDS ALTHOUGH IT DOES HAVE LIMITED PRODUCTION CAPABILITY, E.G., SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION AND SOME INFANTRY WEAPONS. ALTHOUGH EMPHASIS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INCREASING CAPABILITY CONTINUES AND SOME ORGANIZATIONAL AND PRODUCTION ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT BURMA WILL ACHIEVE EVEN A MINIMUM LEVEL OF SELF SUFFICIENCY IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. BURMA DOES NOT ACCEPT MILITARY ASSISTANCE PER SE (GRANT AID) FROM ANY NATION AT PRESENT, BUT THE U.S. HAS GIVEN BURMA OVER THIRTY MILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF HELICOPTERS, FIXED WING AIRCRAFT AND RADIO EQUIPMENT TO THE BURMESE SINCE 1975 UNDER THE NARCOTICS CONTROL PROGRAM. AT PRESENT, AS FAR AS WE KNOW, BURMA RECEIVES NO CONCESSIONARY CREDIT TO PURCHASE MILITARY EQUIPMENT. INSTEAD, BURMA FOLLOWS A CAUTIOUS PROGRAM OF SELECTIVE BUYING WHICH OBSERVES NATIONAL BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE LIMITATIONS, AND AVOIDS
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 RANGOO 02616 05 OF 06 220453Z

SIGNIFICANT COOPERATION OR APPARENT ALIGNMENT WITH OTHER NATIONS. IN PRACTICE BURMA BUYS SMALL AMOUNTS OF EQUIPMENT (OFTEN USED/ RECONDITIONED), SPARES AND AMMUNITION FROM SEVERAL NATIONS, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES. IN THE RECENT PAST BURMA HAS REPORTEDLY PURCHASED SEVERAL ITEMS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM OTHER NATIONS--E.G., INFANTRY COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT FROM GREAT BRITAIN AND TACTICAL SUPPORT AIRCRAFT (PC7) FROM SWITZERLAND-- AND CURRENTLY IS NEGOTIATING WITH A U.S. FIRM FOR THE COMMERCIAL PURCHASE OF PATROL CRAFT. DETAILS OF PROPOSED PATROL BOAT

PURCHASE--3 105' SWIFT-TYPE VESSELS AT APPROXIMATELY SIX MILLION DOLLARS--ARE BEING FORWARDED TO DEPARTMENT BY SEPTTEL.

12. THE LEVEL OF U.S. FMS CASH AND COMMERCIAL SALES TO BURMA ANNUALLY DEPENDS ALMOST ENTIRELY ON THE RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO BURMA TO MAKE SUCH PURCHASES. RECENTLY, THIS HAS RANGED FROM 500,000 TO A MILLION DOLLARS A YEAR. AS WE ANTICIPATE BEING RESPONSIVE TO THE REQUESTS AND AS WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE FMS CREDIT SALES TO BURMA, THE SUGGESTED ZZB PLANNING LEVELS DO NOT APPEAR TO BE RELEVANT TO THIS PROGRAM.

13. THE EMBASSY HAS PROPOSED A VERY LIMITED IMET PROGRAM FOR BURMA, WHICH HAS NOT YET RECEIVED APPROVAL. THE FOLLOWING SUMMARIZES THE ZZB SUBMISSION RELATIVE THAT PROPOSAL.

A. MINIMUM LEVEL.

(1) DESCRIPTION OF ASSISTANCE TO BE PROVIDED. FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL WOULD ALLOW ONE FIELD GRADE OFFICER TO ATTEND THE U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COURSE AND ONE SENIOR COMPANY GRADE OFFICER FOR IOAC AND FOLLOW-ON RANGER AIRBORNE AND OJT TRAINING.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 RANGOO 02616 05 OF 06 220453Z

(2) BENEFIT ASSESSMENT. THERE IS NO RISK TO THE U.S. IN NOT ESTABLISHING AN IMET PROGRAM FOR BURMA. BURMESE MILITARY PERSONNEL HAVE NOT BEEN TRAINED BY THE U.S. THROUGH SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS SINCE FY 68, PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF PRESIDENT NE WIN'S POLICY, BUT THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE GUB MAY NOW BE AMENABLE TO IMET TRAINING.

(3) MILITARY CONSEQUENCES OF NOT APPROVING MINIMUM LEVEL. THERE WOULD BE NO DIRECT MILITARY IMPACT IF TRAINING WAS NOT PROVIDED. A MINIMAL IMET PROGRAM WOULD NOT MEASURABLY ALTER THE GUB CAPABILITY TO COMBAT INSURGENCIES OR TO SUPPRESS NARCOTIC TRAFFIC.

B. INTERMEDIATE LEVEL.

(1) DESCRIPTION OF ASSISTANCE TO BE PROVIDED. A SECOND FIELD GRADE OFFICER FOR C AND GSC AND TWO ADDITIONAL SENIOR COMPANY GRADE OFFICERS FOR IOAC AND FOLLOW-ON TRAINING.

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 01 RANGOO 02616 06 OF 06 220456Z
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 EA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10 L-03
NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11 AID-05
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5675
INFO CINCPAC
SECDEF WASH DC
JCS WASH DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 6 OF 6 RANGOON 2616

(2) BENEFIT ASSESSMENT OF INTERMEDIATE LEVEL. THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THE INTERMEDIATE PROGRAM, LIKE THE MINIMAL PROGRAM, IS POLITICAL IN NATURE, THAT OF DEMONSTRATING U.S. INTEREST AND ATTEMPTING TO INFLUENCE THE ATTITUDES OF FUTURE BURMESE LEADERS. THE INTERMEDIATE PROGRAM WOULD HAVE GREATER IMPACT.

C. BASIC LEVEL.

(1) DESCRIPTION OF ASSISTANCE TO BE PROVIDED. FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL WOULD EXPAND THE SCOPE OF THE PROGRAM TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL SENIOR AND MIDDLE-MANAGEMENT COURSES IN LOGISTIC AND TECHNICAL AREAS, INCLUDING:

SENIOR OFFICER PREVENTIVE LOGISTICS (FOLLOW-ON TO C AND G'S) (1)
SUPPLY MANAGEMENT OFFICER (1)
OJT LOGISTICS TRAINING (FOLLOW-ON TO ABOVE LINE)
QM OFFICER ADVANCED (CORE AND GI SMM) (1)
SIGNAL OFFICER ADVANCED (1)
ENGINEER OFFICER ADVANCED (1)
NAVAL STAFF COURSE (1)
SQUADRON OFFICER SCHOOL (1)
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 RANGOO 02616 06 OF 06 220456Z

ACADEMIC INSTRUCTOR SCHOOL (FOLLOW-ON TO ABOVE LINES) (9).

(2) BENEFIT ASSESSMENT OF INTRODUCING A BASIC LEVEL ESTABLISHING AN IMET PROGRAM AT THIS LEVEL WOULD DEMONSTRATE U.S. INTEREST IN SEOLIDIFYING OUR RELATIONS WITH BURMA. HOWEVER, AN EVOLVING

PROGRAM, BUILDING SLOWLY, WOULD BE MORE MANAGEABLE THAN
BEGINNING WITH A LARGER PROGRAM AND WOULD PERMIT AN ASSESSMENT
OF THE IMPACT OF A MINIMUM OR INTERMEDIATE PROGRAM.

14. PROPOSED SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (\$ IN THOUSANDS):.

IMET	
FY77 ACTUAL	0
FY78 ESTIMATED	0
FY79 PROPOSED	0
FY80 MINIMUM (EST.)	31
INTERMEDIATE (EST.)	75
BASIC (AS DESCRIBED)	UNKNOWN

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Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978RANGOO02616
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780301-0615
Format: TEL
From: RANGOON
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780730/aaaaazlx.tel
Line Count: 616
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: b3a48a6e-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION PM
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 12
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 78 STATE 167901, 78 STATE 182987
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 28 apr 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1918451
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE--BURMA-- FY 1980
TAGS: MASS, MPOL, BM
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odhc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/b3a48a6e-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
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